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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES C. ENGLERT and JO ANN 
ENGLERT, Husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
-vs-
HENRY E. ZANE and DOROTY G. 
ZANE, husband and wife, and 
JOHN A. McNEIL and KATHY 
McNEIL, husband and wife, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Case No. 910490 
Category No. 16 
ADDENDUM TO APPELLANTS1 BRIEF 
Addendum to Appellants1 Brief containing the following items 
1. Trial Court's Memorandum Decision. 
2. Trial Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
3. Trial Court's Judgment. 
Foremaster 
Plaintiffs/Appellants 
CERTIFICATE/OF SERVICE BY MAILING 
I hereby certify I mailed /four copys of the above and foregoing 
to Mr. Michael D. Hughes, Attorney at Law, 148 East Tabernacle, St. 
George, Utah 84770 on this 21st day of January, 1992, 
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IN THE PISTFICT CCUPT CF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL PISTFICT 
IT! AND FCP WASFINCTON COUNTY, STATF OF UTAH 
CHAFLES C. ENCLFPT and JO ANN ] 
FNGLEPT, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 1 
vs. 
HENPY E. ZANE and DOPOTHY C. ZANE, 
husband and wife; and JOHN A, NcMEIL 
and FATFIE McNEIL, husband and wife, 
1 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
) Civil No. 890502581 
Defendants. 
This matter came on for trial to the bench on October 
24th & 26th, 1990, the Honorable J. Philip Eves presiding. The 
Plaintiffs, Charles C. and JoAnn Enclert were present and 
represented by their attorney, Phillip L. Foremaster. The 
Defendants, Henry E. and Dorothy Zane and John A. and Kathie 
McNeil were present and represented by their attorney, Michael D. 
Hughes. The Defendants had filed a Third Party Complaint naming 
Pussell and Patricia Walter and the Lucky 7 Podeo Corporation, a 
Utah corporation, as Third-party Defendants. Mr. VJalter was 
present and all Third-Party Defendants were represented by Gary W. 
Pendleton, their attorney. During the trial the Defendants/Third 
Party Plaintiffs and the Third-Party Defendants reached a 
stipulated settlement of their dispute and upon stipulation of all 
1. 189 
parties the Court dismissed the Third-Party Complaint, 
^hereafter, Mr. Pendleton left and neither he nor those 
represented by him participated further as parties. 
The Court took evidence in the matter, viewed the 
property in question at the request of the parties, and heard 
arguments of counsel. The matter was then taken under 
submission. The Court now renders the following Decision and 
Judgment upon proof by a preponderance of the evidence. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
In the mid-1960's, Russell and Patricia Walter owned a 
tract of land north of the town of Veyo in Washington County, 
Utah. They decided to subdivide the land and in doing so 
eventually created the Brookside Summer Homes Subdivision 
(E.S.H.S.). The property was surveyed by one Jack R. Newville, a 
registered land surveyor and professional engineer. The B.S.H.S. 
plat was approved and recorded in the office of the Washington 
County Recorder in mid-1965. Thereafter, the lots were sold to 
various buyers, primarily by Russell Walter. 
The Washington County Assessor assessed taxes on the 
subdivided lots on the basis on the recorded subdivision plat. 
Prior to survey, Fr. Walter instructed Mr. Newville that 
he should lay out the subdivision , insofar as possible, to make 
2. 
ISO 
the Santa Clara Piver, which traverses the property, the common 
boundary between the lots on each side. It was Mr. Walter's 
intention and design that the lots on both sides of the river have 
title to the center line of the river. After the subdivision map 
was completed, it appeared that ™r. Walter's instructions had been 
followed as there was a meanderinq border down the center of the 
subdivision which Mr. Walters/ and everyone else, assumed followed 
the course of the river. The location of the river did not appear 
on the subdivision plat. There was no attempt to check on the 
assumption regarding the river border until 1983 when the 
Plaintiffs in this case commissioned a survey of Lots 12 and 13 in 
preparation for purchase thereof. The survey revealed that the 
river was not on the boundary line between those lots and Lots 5, 
6 and 7 which adjoined Lots 12 and 13 on the northwest. 
As Mr. Walter sold the lots in his subdivision to 
various buyers he informed each buyer whose lot appeared to abut 
the river that they were in fact acquiring title to the center 
line of the river and nothing on the other side of the river. 
This v/as based on Mr. Walter's assumption that his instructions to 
Mr. Newville had been followed. Mr. Walter also inserted in all 
but two deeds issued in the B.S.H.S. subdivision a reservation 
which he intended to act as a guarantee that even if the course of 
3 
the river changed the boundary line between the lots would change 
with it. The language of the reservation conveyed the property 
"less any part crossing the Santa Clara Fiver". This language was 
contained in the deed issued to the first purchaser of Lot 13 and 
to several others thereafter but was not included in the chain of 
deeds to the purchasers of Lot 12. 
In the first year or so after the subdivision was 
recorded, Mr. Walter sold Lot 7 to Mr. and Mrs. Karr on a Real 
Estate Sales Contract. The Karrs immediately took possession and 
began building a house on the lot which was completed by the end 
of 1967 or the beginning of 1968. In 1969, after the real estate 
contract was paid off, Mr. Walter recorded a warranty deed 
transferring title from the Lucky 7 Rodeo Corporation to the 
Karrs. The Karrs were told at the time that they purchased the 
property that they owned the land up to the center of the river 
and were actually taken to the property and shown survey stakes by 
Mr. Walter which he said evidenced that boundary. The Karrs 
purchased the property after receiving those representations. 
Immediately after signing the real estate contract the Karrs began 
using the land to the river's edge for various recreational 
pursuits, as a back yard, for access to the river and for the 
maintenance of landscaping such as grasses and trees. Some of the 
plants in the area were natural and some imported and planted by 
4. 
the Karrs. The area was kept groomed to the water's edge. Mr. 
Walter observed this use and testified that it continued for 
several years after the Karrs took possession. 
Within a short tine after the Karrs bought Lot 7, Mr. 
and Mrs. Glenn Myers bought Lot 6, also on a land sales 
agreement. They also took possession of the property immediately 
and placed a mobile home thereon. The exact date that they 
purchased the property or took possession was not established by 
the evidence but the Karrs and the Myers were among the first 
purchasers in the subdivision. Title to Lot 7 was transferred by 
warranty deed to the Myers in 1972 after they paid off their land 
sales contract. The county tax records indicate a mobile home 
first appeared on the property in the 1970 assessment. The Myers 
were also told by Mr. Walter when they purchased that their land 
extended to the center line of the river. Sometime after their 
purchase of the land, the Myers began using the property to the 
water's edge much in the same way as the Karrs were doing. 
The Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that 
Lots 6 and 7 were used much in the same fashion through various 
owners thereafter to the present title holders, Mr. and 
5. 
Mrs. Zane on Lot 7 and Mr. and Mrs. McNeil on Lot 6, the testimony 
of Mr. Santa Maria notwithstanding. The Court's onsight 
inspection revealed that both the Zanes and the McNeils continue 
to use the land in the same ways as did their predecessors. 
The Washington County Assessor assumed that the river 
was the boundary between Lots 5, 6 and 7 on one side and Lots 12 
and 13 on the other but the taxes were assessed not on the 
location of the river but on the location of the property lines as 
shown on the subdivision plat recorded in the County Recorder's 
Office. The Court finds that no taxes for Lots 12 and 13 were 
ever paid by the owners of Lots 6 and 7. 
When these Plaintiffs commissioned the 1988 re-survey of 
Lots 12 and 13, which lots they intended to acquire from one 
Dorothy Wirtz, they discovered that the survey did not follow the 
river as the boundary between Lots 12 and 13 on one the hand, and 
Lots 5, 6 and 7 on the other. Indeed the re-survey showed that 
the Santa Clara River runs through Lots 12 and 13 and Lots 6 and 7 
do not abut the river at all. In addition, the re-survey showed 
that the hones on Lots 6 and 7 were actually situated astride the 
property boundaries. The home built by Karrs on Lot 7 and now 
occupied by the Zanes is actually partially on Lot 7 and partially 
on Lot 12. The home (mobile home with a permanent and fixed 
6. 
addition) placed by Kyers and now occupied by McNeils, is partly 
on Lot 6, partly on Lot 12, and party on Lot 13. 
Cn Pay 2, 1°89, the Englerts filed this suit alleging 
encroachment and praying for removal of the encroaching 
structures. The defense answered and counterclaimed asserting 
several affirmative defenses. 
The Plaintiffs testified that in their opinion the 
property north and west of the Santa Clara River had a value of 
fifty cents per square foot. They also testified that if the 
Defendants were allowed to take a portion of the property north 
and west of the Santa Clara River from Lots 12 and 13, any portion 
remaining on that side of the river would be reduced in value by 
one-half. On the other hand, Mr. Walter testified on the basis of 
his expertise regarding values in the subdivision and real 
property generally in that area of Washington County that land 
values have decreased about 20 per cent since the Plaintiffs 
bought Lots 12 and 13 from Mrs. Wirtz at a total price of 
$22,900.00 for both lots. That purchase price equates to 25 cents 
per square foot. 
ANALYSIS 
The Plaintiffs Complaint alleges encroachment by the 
Defendants. The law is settled that no person has the right to 
erect buildings or other structures upon his own land so that any 
7. 
part thereof will extend beyond his boundaries onto the land of an 
adjoining property owner. (1 Am Jur 2d, Section 118, page 769), 
The predecessors in interest of the defendants in this matter have 
clearly violated this rule of law. That does not however end our 
inquiry in the matter. 
The Plaintiffs herein seek the equitable remedy of 
ejectment of the Defendants. They wish to have the Court order 
the Defendants to remove the encroaching structures from Lots 12 
and 13. The Court is therefore constrained to consider the 
peculiar equities of this case to determine whether the Plaintiffs 
are entitled to this equitable relief. 
This case presents some unusual circumstances. It 
appears that the subdivider of the property and all those who 
bought in the subdivision up to the Plaintiffs simply assumed that 
the. river constituted the boundary line between the various pieces 
of property. The subdivider so informed all of those to whom he 
sold pieces of property. In addition, the subdivider included 
language in the deeds to Lots 5, 6, 7 and 13 which he intended to 
assure that the property line would remain the center line of the 
river . 
It also appears that if the encroaching structures are 
moved they would be destroyed, or severely damaged and that those 
structures are valued at $80,000.00 to $85,000.00 each. These 
8. 
structures appear to have been in place for less than 20 years in 
the case of the McNeils and over 20 years in the case of the Zanes 
prior to the filing of this lawsuit. In addition, the survey plat 
which established the actual property boundaries has been a matter 
of public record in the Washington County Recorder's office for 
over 24 years prior to the filing of the lawsuit. 
There is no evidence before this Court that prior to 
these Plaintiffs, anyone ever complained about the location of the 
boundaries or questioned the location of the Defendants' homes. 
All previous owners in the subdivision have assumed that the 
boundary was the center line of the river, although a routine 
survey would have shown the discrepency. 
As the subdivision was actually laid out the river would 
run through Lots 12 and 13 and divide those lots. That would 
leave small parcels of Lots 12 and 13 to the north and west of the 
river which would not be suitable for construction of residences 
and which would not be accessable from the main portion of those 
lots without construction of a bridge at considerable expense in 
view of the fact that the river often rises dramatically during 
the runoff season. 
The Plaintiffs have not undertaken construction of 
improvements on Lots 12 and 13 and there remains on the southeast 
side of the river sufficient area for the Plaintiffs to construct 
9 
a residence as they testified they desired to do. Both the 
Plaintiffs1 and the Defendants' predecessors in interest purchased 
their lots with the clear understanding that the center line of 
the river was the boundary. The subdivider and the County Tax 
Assessor also have believed that such was the case and and have so 
represented the situation to the property owners. The Plaintiffs 
were aware of the boundary dispute when they purchased Lots 12 and 
12. 
In weighing these equities the Court is convinced that 
requiring removal of the encroaching structures would not do 
equity. The persons now possessing the residences did not 
construct then, and did not know that they were encroaching on 
adjoining properties at the time that they purchased the 
property. In addition, there is no evidence that the predecessors 
in interest of these Plaintiffs ever raised an objection to the 
construction of the encroaching structures and in fact it appears 
that those predecessors bought their land with the understanding 
that their land only extended to the center line of the river. 
The Court is of the opinion that the Plaintiffs have an 
adequate remedy at law since their loss can be compensated by 
assessment of damages in their favor if in fact they are entitled 
to any legal remedy at all. Assessing damages and allowing the 
encroachments to remain will not destroy or significantly hinder 
the intended use and enjoyment of the property contemplated by the 
Plaintiffs. 
The Court then turns to the question of whether or not 
the Plaintiffs are entitled to any remedy in face of the defenses 
raised by the Defendants. The Defendants have listed several 
defenses in their Answer but have not briefed or asserted all of 
them. The defenses v/hich the Defendants have asserted are: 
1. Adverse possession; 
2. Statute of limitations; 
3. Boundary by acquiescence; 
4. Boundary by agreement; 
5. Prescriptive easement (profit a prendre). 
The Court will address those defenses seriatum. 
ADVERSE POSSESSION 
The Defendants attempted to show through testimony of 
the Washington County Assessor and his subordinates that they had 
paid taxes for more than seven years on those portions of Lots 12 
and
 fc13 north and west of the river. The evidence did not support 
their contention. It is clear that the tax assessment was based 
on the lots as shown on the public record. The assessor did not 
check the survey and was not aware that parts of Lots 12 and 13 
were located north and west of the river. The assessor made no 
adjustment to the taxes for any of the lots on the basis that the 
McNeils and the Zanes and their predecessors were occupying land 
in Lots 12 and 13. In short, there was no evidence presented 
which would allow this Court to find that the owners of Lots 5 and 
7 ever paid taxes on any portion of Lots 12 and 13. 
11. 
Adverse possession has been codified in Utah, Section 
78-12-12 U.C.A., 1953 as Amended, clearly provides that title by 
adverse possession cannot be acquired without payment of ". . . 
all taxes which have been levied and assessed upon such land 
according to lav;". The defense of adverse possession must fail 
since there is no showing that the owners of Lots 5 and 7 ever 
paid any taxes on any portions of Lots 12 and 13. 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
The Defendants did not press this defense except to 
briefly mention it as it relates to their claim of adverse 
possession. Since the adverse possession defense has failed it 
follows that this defense must also fail. In addition, Section 
78-12-6 U.C.A. is inapplicable since the Defendants were "seized" 
(legal title holders) of the disputed property within 7 years of 
filing the suit. 
BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE 
The Utah Supreme Court has recently addressed Boundary 
by Acquiescence on several occasions. The most recent cases 
re-establish four elements to be proven by the proponent: 
1. Occupation up to a visibile line marked by 
monuments, fences or buildings; 
2. Mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary; 
3. For a long period of time; 
4. By adjoining land owners. 
(See Judd Family Limited Partnership v. Hutchings, 
141 U.A.R. 8; Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P. 2d 417). 
12. 
A review of the cases decided in Utah does not reveal 
whether a river constitutes a sufficient monument of a boundary to 
establish the above elements. Other authorities have held, 
however, that a river may be a sufficient monument to mark a 
boundary. 
"When relating to land, a monument is some 
tangible landmark established to indicate a 
boundary. Objects, to be ranked as monuments, 
have been required to have certain physical 
properties such as visibility, permanence 
and stability, and definite location, 
independent of measurements. Monuments are 
of two kinds, natural and artificial. . ." 
(See 11 C.J.S. Boundaries,Section 5, page 545). 
"Natural monuments are objects permanent in 
character which are found on the land as they 
were placed by nature, such as • . . streams 
and rivers.'1 
(See 11 C.J.S. Boundaries, Section 6, page 546 
and footnote 88, same page.) 
[See also Ellery v. Pacific Lumber Co., 281 
P. 428 (Cal.); Drake v. Russian River Land Co.; 
103 P. 167 (Cal.); Goodson v. Fitzgerald, 
90 S.W. 898 (Texas)] 
Under the facts of this case this Court finds that the 
Santa Clara River is a sufficient boundary monument. It is clear 
from the testimony of the subdivider that each lot owner who 
purchased in the subdivision was told that the river was in fact 
the boundary. There is no evidence that the river has moved. The 
13. 
river is certainly visible, permanent and stable, and has a 
definite location. 
The evidence clearly shows that the Defendants and their 
predecessors in interest have occupied those portions of Lots 12 
and 13 north and west of the river and abutting Lots 6 and 7 as 
though the river were the boundary. 
The next element is mutual acquiescence in the river as 
a boundary. 
The Court finds that no one ever questioned the river 
being the boundary until 1988. It appears that everyone living in 
the subdivision assumed that the river was the boundary and 
conducted themselves accordingly. The prior owners of Lots 12 and 
13 never disputed the Defendants1 occupation of the now disputed 
portions of Lots 12 and 13 prior to these Plaintiffs, for a period 
of some 23 years after the subdivision was created. The doctrine 
of 'boundary by acquiescence does not require an agreement between 
adjoining landov/ners to establish a particular monument as a 
boundary. Rather it requires only that the adjoining owners treat 
the monument as a boundary for the required time period. This is 
more akin to a prescriptive right than a contractual right. [See 
Lav/ of Practical Location of Boundaries and the Need for an 
Adverse Possession Remedy, Brigham Young University Law Review, 
14. 
1986, by James H. Backman, hereinafter P.Y.U. L.R. 1986. } This 
doctrine is founded on the policy ennunciated by the Supreme Court 
when it said, 
" . . . that the peace and good order of 
society require that there be stability 
• . . in the ownership and occupation of 
lands . . . [B]cundary lines which have 
been long established and accepted by 
those who should be concerned should be 
left undisturbed in order to leave at rest 
matters which may have resulted in 
controversy and litigation . . ." 
[Olson v. Par!: Daughters Investment Co., 
511 P. 2d 145, 147 (1973) ] 
It is not necessary that the boundary was established by 
the parties, or their predecessors in interest as a result of a 
dispute or uncertainty. rstaker v. Ainsworth, supra.] 
It appears therefore that the owners of Lots 12 and 13 
on one side and Lots 6 and 7 on the other did acquiesce in the 
river being the boundary line. 
With regard to the third element, "for a long period of 
time", the Supreme Court has ruled in the case of Hobson v. 
Panguitch Lake Corporation, 530 P. 2d, 792, page 795, as follows: 
"But the opinion reaffirms the view that there 
must be some substantial long period of time 
and states that it is generally related to the 
common-law prescriptive easement period of 
20 years; and only under unusual circumstances 
would a lesser period be deemed sufficient." 
15. 
It is clear that acquiescence in the boundary by 
adjoining property owners must span at least 20 years absent 
unusual circumstances. In the case of the Zanes, v/hose original 
predecessors in interest were the Karrs, it is clear that the time 
requirements for boundary by acouiescence have been met. In the 
case of the McNeils, who traced their interests to the original 
purchasers, the Myers, there is some question as to the length of 
time that the acquiescence has been ongoing. The evidence is 
clear with regard to Lot 7 that it has been occupied by the Zanes 
or their predecessors in interest at least since early 1968, as 
has that portion of Lot 12 north and west of the Santa Clara ^iver. 
However, the evidence does not establish when Lot 6 and 
the portions of Lots 12 and 13, which are north and west of the 
river and abut Lot 6, were occupied by the McNeils1 predecessors 
in interest. The McNeils have failed to carry their burden of 
proof on that point. This Court must find, therefore, that 
although the McNeils are now occupying up the the riverfs edge and 
have been doing so for a considerable period, there is 
insufficient evidence to establish that they have been doing so 
for at least 20 years. 
Therefore, the third element of boundary by acquiescence 
has been shown as to defendants Zane but not as to defendants 
McNeil. 
16. 
The fourth element, "by adjoining landowners" is obvious 
and has been established. 
The Court therefore finds that defendants Zane are 
entitled to a judgment quieting title in them to that parcel 
identified as parcel A on Plaintiff's Exhibit #3 under the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. Defendants McNeil are not 
so entitled. 
BPHNDAPY BY AOPFEMENT 
Boundary by Agreement reauires: 
1. An agreement, 
2. between adjoining landowners. 
3. Settling a boundary that was uncertain or 
in dispute, 
4. executed by actual location of a boundary 
line, 
5. mutual acquiescence for a long period of 
time. 
(See Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P. 2d 417, footnote 4, 
page 423; B.Y.U. L.R. 1°36, page 963.) 
Boundary by Agreement is premised on a contract theory. 
The rationale is that the parties, discovering that they had an 
uncertain or disputed boundary, would get together and settle the 
matter by agreement, locate an actual boundary line between them, 
and mutually honor that boundary for a long period of time (20 
years or more). The facts in this case do not support boundary by 
agreement. Until the 1988 survey commissioned by the Plaintiffs 
17. 
herein none of the lot owners was aware that there was an 
uncertainty or dispute as to the boundary line. Thereafter there 
was never any agreement establishing a boundary line. Boundary by 
agreement does not apply under these facts. 
PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT (Profit a Prendre) 
In the Utah Supreme Court case of Anderson v. 
Osguthorpe, 504 P. 2d 1000 (1972), Justice Ellott discussed the 
establishment of a prescriptive easement in the nature of profit a 
prendre. It appears that the elements which must be shown by the 
proponent of such an easement are as follows: 
1. Exclusive use of the disputed land 
2. for over 20 years 
3. with use thereof being open and notorious, 
continuous, uninterrupted, adverse, and 
under claim of right. 
This Court finds from the evidence that the Zanes have 
met the requirements to establish a prescriptive easement over the 
disputed portions of Lot 12. The evidence clearly demonstrates 
that the Defendants Zane and their predecessors in interest 
exercised exclusive use of the property upon which their home is 
situated and behind that home up to the edge of the river from the 
time that they purchased the property and took possession of it, a 
period of over 20 years. It is likewise clear from the facts that 
18. 
the use cf the property by the Defendants Zane herein was open and 
notorious, continuous, uninterrupted, adverse and under claim of 
right, versus the owners of Lot 12 and was under a claim of right 
based on the representations made to the original buyers by the 
subdivider . 
However, for the reasons set out hereinabove in 
analyzing boundary by acquiescence, this Court finds that the 
Defendants McNeil have failed to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that their use of the disputed portions of Lots 12 and 13 
abutting Lot 6 has continued for the required 20 years. Therefore 
that use has not ripened into a prescriptive easement. 
This Court therefore finds that if the Defendants Zane 
had not acquired title to the property under the doctrine of 
boundary of acquiescence they would have acquired a prescriptive 
easement to use the property as it is now being used and has been 
used historically. In view of such a right to use the property 
the Plaintiffs herein are entitled to no av/ard of damages against 
Defendants Zane. 
The Defendants McNeil are not entitled to a prescriptive 
easement. 
ESTOPPEL 
Defendants raised estoppel as an affirmative defense in 
their Answer but did not assert that defense during trial. For 
purposes of resolving all possible legal issues, however, the 
Court will discuss estoppel as it applies to this case. 
The elements of boundary by estoppel are: 
1. Representations by the true owner that 
the mutually accepted line is the 
true boundary; 
2. reasonable reliance by the neighbor on 
those representations; 
3. substantial costs detrimentally incurred 
by the neighbor, and 
4. true owner knows that his representations 
are erroneous or was grossly negligent 
in making the representations. 
(See B.Y.U. L.P, 1986, page 968) 
In the case before this Court it appears that all the 
eler.ents are met except the last. There is no evidence that the 
original owner, Mr. VJalter, knew that the river was not the 
boundary. Likewise, there is no evidence he was grossly negligent 
in making that representation to his buyers in view of his 
instructions to the surveyor and the appearance of the E.S.K.S. 
plat map with the boundary line seeming to track the river. 
Boundary by estoppel in not made out. 
DAMAGES 
The Court now turns to the issue of damages to be 
assessed against Defendants McNeil for their wrongful encroachment 
on Lots 12 and 13 and their wrongful possession and use of parcels 
B & C as shown on Plaintiff's Exhibit 3. 
Upon stipulation, the parties agreed that parcel B 
contains 5,401.84 square feet and parcel C contains 7,396.42 
square feet. The total of those parcels is therefore 12,798.26 
square feet, which the Court will round down to 12,798\00. 
20. 
Plaintiffs purchased Lots 12 and 13 together at a total cost of 
£22,900.00, or about 25 cents per square foot. Plaintiffs contend 
that the property has doubled in value and cite as proof certain 
"comparable sales'1 in the area. The Court can accord no weight to 
those "comparable sales" since Plaintiffs candidly admitted they 
had never seen these properties and had no idea how they actually 
compared to the property in dispute, including whether they had 
been improved. 
Cn the other hand Defendants offered the testimony of 
Mr. Walter who opined that the value of E.S.K.S. property has 
declined 20 percent since the Plaintiffs purchase in 1988. No 
supporting evidence was offered for Mr. Walter's opinion. 
The Court finds that the best indicator of the value of 
the property is the amount Plaintiff's paid when they purchased in 
1988, or 25 cents per square foot. 
SUMMARY 
Plaintiffs are therefore awarded judgment against 
Defendants McNeil in the amount of $3,199.50 plus interest at 10% 
from May 2, 1989 to date of trial, October 26, 1990, plus costs 
and interest on the entire judgment at 12% per annum simple 
interest from October 26, 1990, until paid in full. Title to the 
portions of Lots 12 and 13 designated as parcels B and C is then 
awarded to Defendants McNeil. 
21. 
Defendants Zane are awarded title to that portion of Lot 
12 designated as parcel A. No damages are assessed. 
No attorney fees are awarded to either side. Counsel 
for Plaintiffs is to prepare an appropriate Judgment. 
ctrt 
DATED this ( ~~ day of November, 1990. 
PHILIP EWS 
fth District Judge 
22. ;10 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES C. ENGLERT and JO ANN 
ENGLERT, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
HENRY E. ZANE and DOROTHY 
G. ZANE, husband and wife; and 
JOHN A. McNEIL and KATHIE 
McNEIL, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW 
Civil No. 890502581 
This matter coming on for trial on October 24 and October 26, 
1990 before the Court sitting without a jury and the Plaintiffs being 
present and being represented by their attorney Phillip L. Foremaster 
and the Defendants being present and being represented by their attorney 
Michael D. Hughes and the Third-Party Defendant being present and 
being represented by his attorney Gary W. Pendleton and during the 
course of the trial a stipulation and agreement having been made 
between the Third-Party Plaintiffs and the Third-Party Defendant 
and he having been thereupon dismissed from the lawsuit and the 
remaining parties having presented testimony and evidence in support 
of their respective positions and the Court being fully advised in 
the premises now finds as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That in the mid-1960fs Russell and Patricia Walter owned 
and created thereon a subdivision known under the name and style 
of Brookside Summer Homes Subdivision (B.S.H.S.). The subject 
property was surveyed by one Jack R. Newville, a registered land 
surveyor and professional engineer and the B.S.H.S. subdivision plat 
was approved and recorded in the Office of the Washington County, 
Utah recorder in mid-1965. Thereafter the subdivision lots were 
solde to various buyers, primarily by Russell Walter. 
2. Since the recording of the B.S.H.S. Subdivision Plat the 
Washington County, Utah Assessor has assessed taxes on the subdivided 
lots on the basis of the information contained on the recorded 
subdivision plat. 
3. Prior to the survey Mr. Walter instructed Mr. Newville that 
he should lay out the subdivision, insofar as possible, to make the 
Santa Clara River, which traverses the property, the common 
boundary between the lots on each side. It was Mr. Walter's intention 
and design that the lots on both sides of the river have title to 
the center line of the river. After the subdivision map was completed, 
it appeared that Mr. Walter's instructions had been followed as there 
was a meandering border down the center of the subdivision which 
Mr. Walter, and everyone else, assumed followed the course of the 
river. The location of the river did not appear on the subdivision 
plat. There was not attempt to check on the assumption regarding 
the river border until 1988 when the Plaintiffs in this case comm-
issioned a survey of Lots 12 and 13 in preparation for the purchase 
thereof. The survey revealed that the river was not on the boundary 
line between those lots and Lots 5, 6 and 7 which adjoin Lots 12 
and 13 on the Northwest. 
4. As Mr. Walter sold the lots in his subdivision to various 
buyers he informed each buyer whose lots appeared to abut the river 
river and nothing on the other side of the river. This was based 
upon Mr. Walter's assumption that his instructions to Mr. Newville 
had been followed. Mr. Walter also inserted in all but two deeds 
issued in the B.S.H.S. Subdivision a reservation which he intended 
to act as a guarantee that even if the course of the river changed 
the boundary line between the lots would change with it. The 
language of the reservation conveyed the property "less any part 
crossing the Santa Clara River'1. This language was contained in 
the deed issued to the first purchaser of Lot 13 and to several others 
thereafter but was not included in the chain of deeds to the pur-
chasers of Lot 12. 
5. The Court finds that the reservation in the deeds was based 
on the presumption set forth in paragraph four above, which presump-
tion was a mistake; as such, the reservation is ineffective and a 
nullity. 
6. In the first year or so after the subdivision was recorded, 
Mr. Walter sold Lot 7 to Mr. and Mrs. Karr on a Real Estate Contract. 
The Karrs immediately took possession and began building a house 
on the lot which was completed by the end of 1967 or the beginning 
of 1968. In 1969, after the real estate contract was paid off, Mr. 
Walter recorded a Warranty Deed transferring title from the Lucky 
7 Rodeo Corporation to the Karrs. The Karrs were told at the time 
that they purchased the property that they owned the land up to the 
center of the river and were actually taken to the property and shown 
survey stakes by Mr. Walter which he said evidenced that boundary. 
The Karrs purchased the property after receiving those representations, 
Immediately after signing the real estate contract the Karrs began 
using the land to the river's edge for various recreational pursuits, 
as a back yard, for access to the river and for the maintenance of 
landscaping such as grasses and trees. Some of the plants in the 
area was kept groomed to the waterrs edge. Mr. Walter observed this 
use and testified that it continued for several years after the Karrs 
took possession. 
7. Within a short time after the Karrs bought Lot 7, Mr. and 
Mrs. Glenn Myers bought Lot 6, also on a land sales agreement. They 
also took possession of the property immediately and placed a mobile 
home thereon. The exact date that they purchased the property or 
took possession was not established by the evidence but the Karrs 
and the Myers were mong the first purchasers in the subdivision. 
Title to Lot 6 was transferred by warranty deed to the Myers in 1972 
after the ypaid off their land sales contract. The county tax records 
indicate a mobile home first appeared on the property in the 1970 
assessment. The Myers were also told by Mr. Walter when they purchased 
that their land extended to the center line of the river. Sometime 
after their purchase of the land, the Myers began using the property 
to the water !s edge much in the same way as the Karrs were doing. 
8. The Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that 
Lots 6 and 7 were used much in the same fashion through various owners 
thereafter to the present title holders, Mr. and Mrs. Zane on Lot 
7 and Mr. and Mrs. McNeil on Lot 6, the testimony of Mr. Santa Maria 
notwithstanding. The Court's onsight inspection revealed that both 
the Zanes and the McNeils continue to use the land in teh same ways 
as did their predecessors. 
9. The Washington county Assessor assumed that the river was 
the boundary between Lots 5,6 and 7 on the one side and Lots 12 and 
13 pn the other but the taxes were assessed not on the locaton of 
the river but on the location of the property lines as shown on the 
subdivison plat recorded in the County Recorder's Office. The Court 
finds that no taxes for Lots 12 and 13 were ever paid by the owners 
10. When these Plaintiffs commissioned the 1988 re-survey of 
Lots 12 and 13, which lots they intended to acquire from one Dorothy 
Wirtz, they discovered that the survey did not follow the river as 
boundary between Lots 12 and 13 on the one hand, and Lots 5,6 and 
7 on the other. Indeed the re-survey showed that the Santa Clara 
River runs through Lots 12 and 13 and Lots 6 and 7 do not abut the 
river at all. In addition, the re-survey showed that the homes on 
Lots 6 and 7 were actually situated astride the property boundaries. 
The home built by the Karrs on Lot 7 and now occupied by the Zanes 
is actually partially on Lot 7 and partially on Lot 12. The home 
(mobile home with a permanent and fixed addition) placed by Myers 
and now occupied by McNeils, is partly on Lot 6, partly on Lot 12 
and partly on Lot 13. 
11. On May 2, 1989 the Englerts filed this suit alleging 
encroachment and praying for removal of the encroaching structures. 
The defense answered and counterclaimed asserting several affirmative 
defenses. 
12. The plaintiffs testified that in their opinion the property 
north and west of the Santa Clara River had a value of fifty cents 
per square foot. They also testified that if the defendants were 
allowed to take a portion of the property north and west of the Sana 
Clara River from Lots 12 and 13, any portion remaining on that side 
of the river would be reduced in value by one-half. On the other 
hand, Mr. Walter testified on the basis of his expertise regarding 
values in the subdivison and real property generally in that area 
of Washington County that land values have decreased about 20 per 
cent since the Plaintiffs bought Lots 12 and 13 from Mrs. Wirtz at 
a total price of $22,900.00 for both lots. That purchase price 
equates to 25 cents per square foot. 
13. The Plaintiff's complaint alleges encroachment hv rha 
Defendants. The law is settled that no person has the right to 
erect buildings or other structures upon his own land so that any 
part thereof will extend beyond his boundaries onto the land of an 
adjoining property owner. 
14. The Court finds that the predecessors in interst of the 
Defendants in this matter have clearly violated this rule. 
15. The Plaintiffs herein seek the equitable remedy of ejectment 
of the Defendant. They wish to have the Court order the Defendants 
to remove the encroaching structures from Lots 12 and 13. The Court 
is therefore constrained to consider the peculiar equities of this 
case to determine whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to this equitable 
relief. 
16. This case presents some unusual circumstances. It appears 
that the subdivider of the property and all those who bought in the 
subdivision up to the Plaintiffs simply assumed that the river 
constituted the boundary line between the various pieces of property. 
The subdivider so informed all of those to whom he sold pieces of 
property. In addition, the subdivider included language in the deeds 
to \Lots 5, 6,7 and 13 which he intended to assure that the property 
line would remain the center line of the river. 
17. It also appears that if the encroaching structures are 
moved they would be destroyed, or severely damaged and that those 
structures are valued at $80,000.00 to $85,000.00 each. These 
structures appear to have been in place for less than 20 years in 
the case of the McNeils and over 20 years in the case of the Zanes 
prior to the filing of this lawsuit. In addition, the survey plat 
which established the actual property boundaries has been a matter 
of public record in the Washington County Recorder1s Office for over 
24 years prior to the filing of the lawsuit. 
18. There is no evidence hpfnrp t-h-ic r™i-v-+- +-u~+- —-•--- -
Plaintiffs anyone ever complained about the location of the bound-
aries or questioned the location of the Defendants' homes. All 
previous owners in the subdivison have assumed that the boundary 
was the center line of the river, althougha routine survey would 
have shown the discrepency. 
19. As the subdivision was actually laid out the river would 
run through Lots 12 and 13 and divide those lots. That would leave 
small parcels of lots 12 and 13 to the north and west of the river 
which would not be suitable for construction of residences and which 
would not be accessable from the main portion of those lots without 
construction of a bridge at considerable expense in view of the fact 
that the river often rises dramatically during the runoff season. 
20. The Plaintiffs have not undertaken construction of impove-
ments on Lots 12 and 13 and there remains on the Southeast side of 
the river sufficient area for the Plaintiffs to construct a residence 
as they testified they desired to do. Both the Plaintiffs and the 
Defendants' predecessors in interest purchased their lots with the 
clear understanding that the center line of the river was the bound-
ary*. The subdivider and the County tax Assessor also have believed 
that such was the case and have so represented the situation to the 
property owners. The Plaintiffs were aware of the boundary dispute 
when the purchased Lots 12 and 13. 
21. In weighing these equities the Court is convinced that 
requiring the removal of the encroaching structures would not do 
equity. The persons now possession the residences did not construct 
them, and did not know that they were encroaching on adjoining 
properties at the time that they purchased the property. In addition, 
these is not evidence that the predecessors in interest of these 
Plaintiffs ever raised an objection to the construction of the en-
croaching structures and in f^ rt- -ft- a^-~~~ *-t--- -•» 
bought their land with the understanding that their land only extended 
to the center line of the river. 
22. The Court is of the opinion that the Plaintiffs have an 
adequate remedy at law since their loss can be compensated by 
assessment of damages in their favor. Assessing damages and allowing 
the encroachments to remain will not destroy or significantly hinder 
the intended use and enjoyment of the property contemplated by the 
Plaintiffs. 
23. There is no evidence before the Court that either the Def-
endants or their predecessors in interest ever paid any taxes on 
Lots 12 and 13 of the subject subdivision. Therefore Adverse 
Possession is not applicable. 
24. Under the facts of this case the Court finds that the 
Santa Clara River is a sufficient boundary monument for applicaiton 
of the doctrine of Boundary Line by Acquiescence. It is clear from 
the testimony of the subdivider that each lot owner who purchased 
in the subdivison was told that the river was in fact the boundary. 
There is not evidence that the river has moved. The river is certainly 
visible, permanent and stable, and has a definite location. 
25. The evidence clearly shows that the Defendants and their 
predecessors in interest have occupied those portions of Lots 12 
and 13 north and west of the river and abutting Lots 6 and 7 as thought 
the river were the boundary. 
26. The Court finds that no one ever questioned the river being 
the bvoundary until 1988. It appears that everyone living in the 
subdivison assumed that the river was the boundary and conducted 
themselves accordingly. The prior owners of Lots 12 and 13 never 
disputed the Defendants1 occupation of the now disputed portions 
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of Lots 12 and 13 prior to these Plaintiffs, for a period of some 
23 years after the subdivision was created. The doctrine of boundary 
by acquiescence does not require an agreement between adjoining land-
owners to establish a particular monument as a boundary. Rather 
it requires only that the adjoining owners treat the monument as 
a boundary for the required time period. This is more akin to a 
prescriptive right than a contractual right. 
27. It appears therefore that the owners of Lots 12 and 13 
on one side and Lots 6 and 7 on the other did acquiesce in the river 
being the boundary line. 
28. It is clear that acquiescence in the boundary by adjoining 
property owners must span at least 20 years absent unusual circums-
tances. In the case of the Zanes, whose original predecessors in 
interest were the Karrs, it is clear that the time requirements for 
boundary by acquiescence have been met. In the case of the McNeils 
who traced their interests to the original purchasers, the Myers, 
there is some question as to the length of time that acquiescence 
has been ongoing. The evidence is clear with regard to Lot 7 that 
it has been occupied by the Zanes or their predecessors in interest 
at least since early 1968, as has that portion of Lot 12 north and 
west of the Santa Clara River. 
29. The Evidence does not establish when Lot 6 and the portions 
of Lots 12 and 13, which are north and west of the river and abut 
Lot 6, were occupied by the McNeils1 prececessors in interest. The 
Mcneils have failed to carry their burden of proof on that point. 
This Court must find, therefore, that although the McNeils are now 
occupying up to the river1s edge and have been doing so for a cons-
iderable period, there is insufficient evidence to establish that 
they have been doing so for at least 20 years. 
30. The Defendants Zane are entitled to judgment of the Court 
quieting title in them under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 
in and to the following described real nrnnprt-v 1 ^ ^ ^ -,••« TT~-U,--~O- — 
County, State of Utah, to-wit: 
Beginning at the Southwest Corner of Lot 7, Brookside Summer Homes 
Subdivision and running thence South parallel with the East 
boundary line of lot 12 of said subdivison to the center of the Santa 
Clara River; thence easterly along the center line of the Santa Clara 
River to the East lot line of said Lot 12; thence Northerly along 
said east boundary line of said lot 12 to the Northeast corner of 
said Lot 12; thence Westerly along the Northerly Boundary Line of 
said Lot 12 to the point of beginning. 
31. The Defendants McNeil, having failed to establish a suffi-
cient length of holding for boundary line by acquiescence are not 
entitled to any order quieting title to them in any of the involved 
real property. 
32. The Defendants raised as a defense to the Plaintiffs1 
Complaint the defense of Boundary By Agreement however the Court 
finds no such agreement and therefore no merit in such defense. 
33. In addition to the aforesaid findings the Court finds that 
the Defendants Zane have showing sufficient evidence to establish 
a prescriptive easement in the above entitled real property however 
the Defendants McNeil have failed to meet their burden of proof to 
support such a claim. 
34. The Defendants McNeil have encroached upon the following 
described real property located in Washington County, Utah and 
belonging to the Plaintiffs said encroachment being wrongful, said 
property being described as follows: 
Beginning at the Southwest Corner of Lot 6, Brookside Summer Homes 
Subdivision and running Southerly parallel with the East boundary 
line of Lot 13 of said Subdivision to the center of the Santa Clara 
River; thence Easterly along the center line of the Santa Clara River 
to the East boundary line of said Lot 13; thence Northerly along 
the East boundary line of said lot 13 to the Northeast Corner of 
said Lot 13; thence Westerly along the North boundary line of said 
Lot 13 to the point of beginning. 
Beginning at the Southeast Corner of Lot 6, Brookside bummer Homes 
Subdivision and run thence Southerly parallel with the West 
boundry line of lot 12 of said subdivision to the center of the Santa 
Clark River; thence Westerly along the center line of said Santa 
Clara River to the West boundary line of said lot 12: t-hpnrp Nnr^oriw 
of said Lot 12.; thence Easterly along the North boundary line of 
said Lot 12 to the point of beginning. 
35. As a result of said encroachment the Plaintiffs are 
entitled to be paid damages for the loss of their property because 
of such encroachment in the amount of 25 cents per square foot so 
taken which amount the Court finds as being the fair market value 
for said property so taken. 
36. That according to stipulation of the parties, the total 
square feet taken by said encroachments, described at trial as Parcels 
B and C and referenced in Findings of Fact No. 34, supra, is 12,798 
square feet. That as a result the amount of damage is 25 cents 
multiplied by 12,798 or $3199,50 plus interest at 10 per cent per 
annum from May 2, 1989 to date of trial of October 26, 1990 plus 
costs and interest on the entire judgment at 12 per cent per annum 
from October 26, 1990 until paid in full. 
37. That as soon as judgment is paid the Defendants McNeil 
are entitled to have awarded to them title to the property described 
in Finding numbesr 34 above. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
As Conclusions of Law from the foregoing Findins of Fact the 
Court concludes as follows: 
• 1. That the Defendants Zane are entitled to an order of this 
Court quieting title in them and against Plaintiffs to the real pro-
perty located in Washington County, Utah and particularly described 
in Finding number 30 above. 
2. That the Plaintiffs are entitled to Judgment against the 
Defendants McNeil in the principal sum of $3199.50 together with 
interest thereron from May 2, 1989 to October 26, 1990 plus costs 
and interest on the entire Judgment at 12 per cent per annum from 
October 26, 1990 until paid in full. 
3. That upon payment of said Judgment the DpfpnHant-c M^ IST^ -M 
are entitled to have awarded to them title to the property described 
in Finding number 34 above. 
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. 
Dated this j 0— day ofUtSy, 1991. 
Phillip L. Foremaster No. 1103 
Attorney at Law 
|x®xg#xx§9g 247 Sugar Leo Road 
St. George;Utah ftK2jb8S& 84770-7944 
(801)673-2209 
F17T1. : : ."•••IGT COURT 
.AS. . - : ; , „ . , ; COUNTY 
# 91 SEP 23 RH 1 1 2 9 
CLEKu
 ? 
D E P U T Y ^ / / ^ ^ 
< ^ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES C. ENGLERT and JO ANN 
ENGLERT, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
HENRY E. ZANE and DOROTHY 
G. ZANE, husband and wife; and 
JOHN A. McNEIL and KATHY 
McNEIL, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 890502581 
This matter coming on for trial on October 24 and October 26, 
1990 before the Court sitting without a jury and the Plaintiffs being 
present and being represented by their attorney Phillip L. Foremaster 
and the Defendants and Third-party Plaintiffs being represented by 
their attorney Michael D. Hughes and the Third Party Defendant being 
present and being represented by his attorney Gary W. Pendleton and 
during the course of the trial a stipulation and agreement havinf 
v^ been made between the Third-Party Plaintiffs and the Third-Party 
.y Defendants and said Third-party Defendant having been thereupon 
sf dismissed from the lawsuit and the parties having presented certain 
testimony and exhibits and the Court having been fully advised in 
( the premises and having caused to be entered its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and ordered judgment in accordance therewith;.,* 
NOW THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED i-hat-
County, State of Utah is hereby quieted in the Defendants Henry E. 
Zane and Dorothy G. Zane, husband and wife, and against the Plaintiffs, 
said real property being particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at the Southwest Corner of Lot 7, Brookside Summer Homes 
Subdivision and running thence South parallel with the East Boundary 
Line of Lot 12 of said subdivision to the center of the Santa Clara 
River; thence Easterly along the center line of the Santa Clara River 
to the East lot line of said Lot 12; thence Northerly along said 
East Boundary Line of said Lot 12 to the Northeast Corner of said 
Lot 12; thence Westerly along the Northerly Boundary Line of said 
Lot 12 to the point of beginning. 
It is further ORDERED that the Plaintiffs Charles C. Englert 
and Jo Ann Englert do have judgment against the Defendants John A. 
McNeil and Kathie McNeil, husband and wife in the principal sum of 
$3199.50 together with interest thereon at the rate of 10 per cent 
per annum from May 12, 1989 to October 26, 1990 in the amount of 
$466.91, making a total Judgment of $3666.41 together with costs 
and interest thereon at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from October 
26, 1990 until paid in full. 
It is further ORDERED that upon payment of said Judgment title 
to the following described real property located in Washington 
County, Utah shall be awarded to the Defendants John A. McNeil and 
Kathie McNeil, said property being described as follows: 
Beginning at the Southwest Corner of Lot 6, Brookside Summer Homes 
Subdivision and running thence parallel with the East Boundary Line 
of Lot 13 of said Subdivision to the center of the Santa Clara River; 
thence Easterly along the center line of the Santa Clara River to 
the East Boundary Line of said Lot 13; thence Northerly along the 
East boundary line of said Lot 13 to the Northeast Corner of said 
Lot 13; thence Westerly along the North Boundary Line of said Lot 
13 to the point of beginning. 
Beginning at the Southeast Corner of Lot 6, Brookside Summer Homes 
Subdivision and running thence Southerly parallel with the West 
Boundary Line of Lot 12 of said Subdivision to the center of the 
Santa Clara River; thence Westerly along the center line of said 
Santa Clara River to the West Boundary Line of said Lot 12; thence 
Northerly along the West Boundary Line of said Lot 12 to the Northwest 
Corner of said Lot 12; thence Easterly along the North Boundary Line 
of said Lot 12 to the nnitu-
 nf u • 
i-u Lne point of beginning, 
Dated this JO^ day of '£^1991. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES C. ENGLERT and JO ANN 
ENGLERT, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
HENRY E. ZANE and DOROTHY 
G. ZANE, husband and wife; 
JOHN A. McNEIL and KATHY 
McNEIL, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
and 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 890502581 
This matter coming on for trial on October 24 and October 26, 
1990 before the Court sitting without a jury and the Plaintiffs being 
present and being represented by their attorney Phillip L. Foremaster 
and the Defendants and Third-party Plaintiffs being represented by 
their attorney Michael D. Hughes and the Third Party Defendant being 
present and being represented by his attorney Gary W. Pendleton and 
during the course of the trial a stipulation and agreement havinf 
v^ been made between the Third-Party Plaintiffs and the Third-Party 
.y Defendants and said Third-party Defendant having been thereupon 
V dismissed from the lawsuit and the parties having presented certain 
^ 
testimony and exhibits and the Court having been fully advised in 
Lb 
X 
I the premises and having caused to be entered its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and ordered judgment in accordance therewith; ,, 
NOW THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that 
County, State of Utah is hereby quieted in the Defendants Henry E. 
Zane and Dorothy G. Zane, husband and wife, and against the Plaintiffs, 
said real property being particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at the Southwest Corner of Lot 7, Brookside Summer Homes 
Subdivision and running thence South parallel with the East Boundary 
Line of Lot 12 of said subdivision to the center of the Santa Clara 
River; thence Easterly along the center line of the Santa Clara River 
to the East lot line of said Lot 12; thence Northerly along said 
East Boundary Line of said Lot 12 to the Northeast Corner of said 
Lot 12; thence Westerly along the Northerly Boundary Line of said 
Lot 12 to the point of beginning. 
It is further ORDERED that the Plaintiffs Charles C. Englert 
and Jo Ann Englert do have judgment against the Defendants John A. 
McNeil and Kathie McNeil, husband and wife in the principal sum of 
$3199-50 together with interest thereon at the rate of 10 per cent 
per annum from May 12, 1989 to October 26, 1990 in the amount of 
$466.91, making a total Judgment of $3666.41 together with costs 
and interest thereon at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from October 
26, 1990 until paid in full. 
It is further ORDERED that upon payment of said Judgment title 
to the following described real property located in Washington 
County, Utah shall be awarded to the Defendants John A. McNeil and 
Kathie McNeil, said property being described as follows: 
Beginning at the Southwest Corner of Lot 6, Brookside Summer Homes 
Subdivision and running thence parallel with the East Boundary Line 
of Lot 13 of said Subdivision to the center of the Santa Clara River; 
thence Easterly along the center line of the Santa Clara River to 
the East Boundary Line of said Lot 13; thence Northerly along the 
East boundary line of said Lot 13 to the Northeast Corner of said 
Lot 13; thence Westerly along the North Boundary Line of said Lot 
13 to the point of beginning. 
Beginning at the Southeast Corner of Lot 6, Brookside Summer Homes 
Subdivision and running thence Southerly parallel with the West 
Boundary Line of Lot 12 of said Subdivision to the center of the 
Santa Clara River; thence Westerly along the center line of said 
Santa Clara River to the West Boundary Line of said Lot 12; thence 
Northerly along the West Boundary Line of said Lot 12 to the Northwest 
Corner of said Lot 12; thence Easterly along the North Boundary Line 
of said Lot 12 to the point of beginning, 
Dated this /C& day of "25^1991. 
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